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ACCOMMODATION PARTIES TO
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
WMLrA

0. MoMs*

"He that is surety for a stranger shall smart for
it; and he that hateth suretyship is sure."
11 Proverbs, 15

F

Rom

the time man's memory runneth not to the contrary those

engaged in extending credit have sought satisfactory means of
diminishing the apparent financial risk. Through the years variousmeans of protecting creditors against financial loss have been developed and used with varying degrees of success. Some of the
security arrangements in most common use today include the use
of pledges, mortgages, conditional sales contracts, contracts of
guaranty, contracts of suretyship, accommodation cosigners and
tyship must be considered along with the Uniform Negotiable Inindorsers.
While each of these security arrangements merits lengthy and
individual consideration, this article is limited in scope to an examination and consideration of the rights and liabilities of one who has
lent his credit to another by placing his signature upon a negotiable
instrument as an accommodation maker or indorser.
The rights and liabilities of accommodation parties are governed not only by the laws relating to negotiable instruments, but
also by the laws applicable to suretyship. The general laws of suretyship must be considered along with the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act for a complete determination of the legal problems
involved.
*Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
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The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act has been enacted
by the legislature of every state in the union in substantially the
same terms. Only Pennsylvania, Massachusetts and Kentucky,
after having adopted the act, have seen fit to substitute in its
place the Uniform Commercial Code. The uniform act has been a
part of the general laws of the state of West Virginia since 1907.1
This legislation was enacted not only for codification of the rules
of the law merchant, the common law, but to aid in producing a
greater degree of certainty and uniformity to the statutory laws
and the judicial determinations of the various states. The failure of
the several state legislatures to adopt exactly the same language
for the statutes and the fact that the courts of the different states
have not always given the same construction to the languages of the
statutes have in some measure contributed to lack of desired uniformity in this field of the law.
The judiciary of the different states have construed the language of the act as fixing liability of the parties to a negotiable
instrument by the capacity in which their signature appears on the
instrument, whether as indorser, maker, drawer, or acceptor.2 The
right of one to show that he intended to incur liabilities other than
those associated with the position of his signature or indorsement
upon the instrument is denied as being in violation of the parol
evidence rule. If one places his name upon the instrument at the
place where it is customary to sign as maker, the one so signing
may not introduce parol evidence to show that he only intended
to have the liability of an indorser. Nor may it be so shown that
one who has placed his signature upon the instrument by the way
of an indorsement intended to incur the liability of a guarantor.3
1 W. VA. CoDE ch. 46 (Michie 1955).
2 Union Bank of Milwaukee v. Commercial Securities Co., 163 Wis. 470,
157 N.W. 510 (1916). The court in quoting from the case of Halbach v.
Trester, 102 Wis. 96, 78 N.W. 759 (1899) observed: "In Halbach v. Trester
it was said in effect, that the engagement which the law implies from the
circumstances of a person placing his name on the back of note, in form, as
an endorser, is just as immune from danger of being varied by parol evidence
as any other written contract There being no claim of fraud in securing the
endorsement, the trial court properly rejected the testimony by which it was
sought to establish the fact that defendants did not intend to bind themselves
as endorsers."
Lake
Street State Bank v. Hunter, 170 Minn. 128, 212 N.W.2d (1927).
3
Toler v. Sanders, 77 W. Va. 398, 87 S.E. 462 (1915). Accommodation
parties are liable in the capacity in which their names appear upon the instrument whether as maker or indorser, and the liability is not that of a comaker
when the signature is placed on the instrument as an indorser.
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The legislature has defined an accommodation party to a negotiable instrument as ".... [0] ne who has signed the instrument
as maker, drawer, acceptor or indorser, without receiving value
therefor, and for the purpose of lending his name to some other
person. Such a person is liable on the instrument to a holder for
value, nothwithstanding such holder, at the time of taking the
instrument, knew him to be only an accommodation party."4 The
use of the words "without receiving value" is slightly ambiguous.
The language of the act is subject to two constructions-one, that a
person so placing his name on the instrument may not receive compensation for the use of his credit, 5 or, secondly, that he may receive
consideration for the use of his name so long as he does not receive
part of the consideration for which the instrument was executed or
indorsed.6 The latter position has received acceptance by a number
of our courts. One may thus be an accommodation party and be
entitled to the rights of a surety, although he received consideration
for incurring liability. In Gruberv. Freeman7 the Connecticut court
said: "Without receiving value as used in this section, means without receiving value for the note and not without receiving any consideration for lending his name."8
The fact that one, otherwise an accommodating party, receives
security for his protection when lending his credit to the instrument
does not alter his status as an accommodation party.9
To give validity to the instrument and to create liability thereon
it is necessary that some party part with value therefor. The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act, section 24,10 deals specifically'
with the requirement of consideration in providing: "Every negotiable instrument is deemed prima facie to have been issued for
consideration; and every person whose signature appears thereon
4 W. VA. CODE oh. 46, art. 2, § 9 (Michie 1955); UNIom NzconhAmL
INsThummm Acr § 29.
5Thompson v. Whitney, 17 Hawaii 107 (1905); First National Bank v.
Engebretson, 28 S.D. 185, 132 N.W. 786 (1911); McQueen v. First National
Bank, 36 Ariz. 74,283 Pac. 273 (1929).
6 "The value received within the meaning of section 29, must precede or
be contemporaneous with the obligation of the note." Gruber v. Friedman,

102 Conn. 34, 127 At. 907 (1905); Morris County Brick Co. v. Austin,
79 N.J.L. 273, 275, 75 AUt. 550 (1910).
7
102 Conn. 34, 127 At. 907 (1925).
8
Carr v.Wainwright, 43 F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 1922).
9 First National Bank's Receiver v. Boreing's Adm'rs, 173 Ky. 327, 190
S.W. 1106 (1917).
10 W. V.. CoDE ch.46, art. 2, § 1 (Michie 1955).
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to have become a party thereto for value."" Value is defined by
section 25 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act 12 as any
consideration sufficient to support a simple contract. Even an antecedent or pre-existing debt constitutes value and is deemed such,
whether the instrument is payable on demand or at a future time.
The presumption of consideration thus established is only a prima
facie'8 and not a conclusive presumption of consideration. 1 4 The
majority of the courts which have been called upon to consider the
question of consideration since the adoption of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act have recognized that the burden of proving
want of consideration, or that one is not a holder for value, must
be borne by the defendant as would any other affirmative defense.' 5
It should be noted in comparison that the plaintiff in an action or
suit on a nonnegotiable instrument does not have the benefit of the
presumption of consideration, but has the burden of proving that
the nonnegotiable contract on which the action or suit is based was
supported by consideration. 16
ACCOMODATION MAKM
In determining the liability of the maker of a negotiable instrument, whether he placed his signature upon the note to obtain
personal credit or to lend financial responsibility to another as an
accommodation maker, consideration must be given to section 60
of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act 17 which states: "The
maker of a negotiable instrument by making it engages that he will
pay it according to its tenor, and admits the existence of the payee
and his then capacity to indorse." Attention also should be given
to section 192 of the uniform act 18 which identifies a primary party
'1 The genuineness of the maker's signature having been established, the
note is prima facie evidence that it was given for value, and the burden of

showing want of consideration rests upon him who attacks it on that ground.
Shinn v. Westfall, 95 W. Va. 292, 120 S.E. 762 (1923).
ch. 46, art. 2, , 2 (Michie 1955).
Rauschenbach v. McDaniel s Estate, 122 W. Va. 632, 11 S.E.2d 852

12 W. VA. CODE
13

(1940);

BEANNON, NEOTIABLE INSTRumNTS

393 (6th ed. 1948); Note, 25

CoLum. L. REv. 83 (1925); BTrTON, BLLS AND NoTEs (1943) 403.
14 Holley v. Smalley, 50 App. D.C. 178, 269 Fed. 694 (1921); Meyer v.

Doherty, 1.33 Wis. 398, 113 N.W. 671 (1907).
15 The burden was not carried by the attacking party. Shinn, Ex'r v.
Westfal, 95 W. Va. 292, 120 S.E. 762 (1923).

16 People's Building & Loan Ass'n v. Swain, 198 N.C. 14, 150 S.E. 668

(1929); Spear v. Associated Producing & Refining Corp., 120 Misc. 518, 199

N.Y. Supp. 84 (Sup. Ct.1923).
17 W. VA. CODE ch. 46, art. 5, § 1 (Michie 1955).
IsW. VA. CODE ch. 46, art. 17, § 2 (Michie 1955).
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to a negotiable instrument as: "The person 'primary liable on an
instrument is the person who, by the terms of the instnunent is
absolutely required to pay the same, all other parties are 'secondary'

liable." These two sections establish absolute and unconditional
liability on the part of one signing a negotiable note as maker to

any holder for value,19 notwithstanding any knowledge that the
holder might have had at the time he acquired the instrument as
to the true relationship that existed between the makers.2 0 The New
York court in Goldberg v. Albertss l treated the comaker's relationship to the payee of the note the same whether such comaker actually borrowed the money or is only an accommodation comaker for
22
the borrower.
Presentment for payment is not'necessary as a condition precedent to charge an accommodation maker upon his promissory note.28
However, if the instrument designates the place of payment, and
the maker is ready, willing and able to make such payment at the
designated time and place, this is equivalent to a tender of payment. Such tender does not discharge the debt, nor does the holder
forfeit the sum due.2 4 The ultimate amount of recovery has now
become fixed, interest will no longer accrue,2 5 and any collateral
for the debt will be released,2 6 and the holder must bear the cost
and attorney fees of collecting it elsewhere.2 7 The debt has now
been reduced to an unsecured and noninterest-bearing obligation.
19

The courts with practical unanimity have held that an accommodation
maker is primarily liable to the holder of the instrument. The relation of the
comakers to each other is of no consequence to the holder. Marshall County
Bank2 v. Fonner, 113 W. Va. 451, 168 S.E. 375 (1933).
0 First National Bank v. Kinslow, 2 Cal. App. 2d 476, 38 P.2d 163 (1934).
21161 Misc. 281, 291 N.Y. Supp. 855 (Municipal Ct. City of New York
1956).
22 The payee of a note does not accept one of the makers as a surety
merely because he knows that he is not actually the principal debtor. Jamesson
v. Citizens' Nat. Bank, 130 Md. 75, 99 Atl. 994 (1917); "The act establishes
a liability on the part of an accommodation maker, which is not affected by
an extension of time given by the holder to any other party to the note, even
thotigh as between such party and the accommodation maker a different relation may subsist in fact from that appearing on the face of the paper. The
result is to render somewhat more rigid the rights of the parties as set forth
in the written instrument and so far as the holder is concerned to establish
liability to him upon a firm basis, not easily shaken by parol evidence." Union
Trust Co. v. McGinty, 212 Mass. 205, 98 N.E. 679 (1913).
23W. VA. CODE ch. 46, art. 6, § 1 (Michie 1955); Haskell v. Lason, 31
N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
24
Moore v. Altom, 196 Ala. 158, 71 So. 681 (1916).
25
Deweese v. Middle States Coal, etc., Co., 248 Pa. St. 202, 93 AUt. 958
(1915);
26 Rottman v. Hevener, 54 Cal. App. 474, 202 Pac. 329 (1921).
Tulane Holding Co. v. Keane, 140 Fla. 812, 192 So. 610 (1939).
27
Hostutler v. Alldredge, 235 S.W. 953 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
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licGrr oF lEm4BUrsEmNT

From the date of the very early reported cases the courts of
equity have recognized the obligation of one principally liable to
reunburse his surety for moneys expended by the surety to discharge
the debt.28 The right of recovery is allowed upon the principle
that, when one requests another to become liable for his obligation
he impliedly promises to make reimbursement to his surety.2 9 It was
not necessary for the surety to prove an express agreement on the
part of the principal obligator to reimburse. It was not until the
middle of the eighteenth century that the courts of law, as distinguished from the courts of equity, permitted the surety to recover
from the principal obligor on the theory of an implied contract
of reimbursement. Prior to this period the law courts would only permit an action for reimbursement based upon an express agreement. 30
The Re.tatement of Restitution recognizes the right of the surety
who has paid the principal obligator's debt to seek reimbursement
from the principal obligator by stating: "A person, who, in whole
or part, has discharged a duty which is owed by him, but which
as between himself and another should have been discharged by
the other, is entitled to indemnity from the other .. "31 Certainly,
as between the accommodated and the accommodation party, the
32
former owes the latter the duty to pay the debt.
The right to seek reimbursement does not arise until payment
in whole or in part has been actually made by the surety.33 The
surety's right to seek reimbursement is not dependent upon whether
he has paid before action and judgment. The accommodation party
34
is not deemed a volunteer by making payment before action,
35
3
6
judgment, and execution, if he or the principal was legally liable
28

Ford v. Strowbridge, Nel. 24, 21 Eng. Rep. 780 (1632); Lloyd, The
Surety,
29 66 U. PA. L. REv. 40 (1917).
Decker v. Pope, 1 Selw. 91 (1757); Appleton v. Bascom, Mass. (3
Metc.) 169 (1841); Kage v. Oates, 208 S.W. 126 (Mo. 1919); Layers v.
Jones,80 96 Cal. App. 248, 274 Pac. 78 (1929).
While this case involves bail the principle applied and discussed
should apply to other types of sureties. Carr v. Davis, 64 W. Va. 522, 63 S.E.

522 (1908).

1~s

32 RFmATmMENT,
Note, 23 HAnv.
33

EsTrmoN § 77 (1937).
L. REv. 396 (1910).
Bullard v. Brown, 74 Vt. 120, 52 Atl. 422 (1902).
34 Huffman v. National Surety Co., 244 Ky. 714, 51 S.W. 2d 950 (1932).
35
Counelis v. Counelis, 312 Mass. 694, 53 N.E.2d 177 (1944); Royal
Indemnity
Co. v. Gunzburg, 114 Pa. Super. 303, 173 At 438 (1934).
3
6 Stallworth v. Preslar, 34 Ala. 505 (1859).
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for the debt at the time of payment.3 7 If the surety pays a judgment
obtained against him alone for a valid debt, he is entitled to in38
demnity although the principal was not made a party to the action.
'When the surety and principal obligor are sued in the same action,
the judgment against the surety is conclusive as to the liability and
amount of recovery in his action for reimbursement.3 9
The surety's right to reimbursement upon the implied contract
does not exist until the surety has made payment, although the
existence of this contract right came into being at the time the
instrument was executed. The actual payment only fixes the amount
of the principal's liability under the contract of indemnity. Where
for some reason the surety makes payment to the creditor before
the due date of the note, he must wait until the due date of the
obligation before seeking indemnity. On these facts the period of
the statute of limitations would start to, accrue from the due date
of the instrument and not from the date of the premature payment.40 When the surety's right of recovery is based upon the
contract implied by law for reimbursement, the period in which
suit might be brought would be the statutory period for an action
of assumpsit, as distinguished from the period allowed for an action
41
on the note.
By the weight of authority payment of a negotiable instrument,
at or after maturity,42 by one who has signed as comaker extinguishes the right to sue on the note irrespective of what might
have been the intention of the parties. 43 As the note is discharged
by payment, the only !remedy available to the surety is his right
to recover from the accommodated party for the use of money paid
for the use of the principal. The remedy is not on the bond but
37

Mims v. McDowell, 4 Ga. 182 (1847).

38U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Connors, 222 M11.
App. 1 (1921).

39 Reed v. Humphrey, 69 Kan. 155, 76 Pac. 390 (1904) Fulton County
Gas & Electric Co. v. Hudson River Telephone Co., 200 N.Y. 287, 98 N.E.
1052 (1911); Pitts v. Fugate, 41 Mo. 405 (1867).
4OTilotson v. Rose, 11 Metc. 299 (Mass. 1846); Ross v. Menefee, 125
Ind. 482,25 N.E. 545 (1890).
41
42 Gieseke v. Johnson, 115 Ind. 308, 17 N.E. 573 (1888).
The payment of a negotiable note to the payee or holder, by one or
more of the makers thereof, before maturity, and which is not reissued,
amounts to a discharge of the instrument and destroys the force of a power of
attorney to confess judgment on such note, incorporated therein. Perkins v.
Hall, 123 W. Va. 707, 17 S.E.2d 795 (1941); Gillham v. Troeckler, 804 111.
App. 596, 26 N.E.2d 418 (1940); Harris v. King, 118 Cal. App. 357, 298 Pac.
100 (1931); Note 48 W. VA. L.Q. 280 (1942).
43 Cussen v. Brandt, 97 Va. 1, 32 S.E. 791, 75 Am. St. Rep. 762 (1899);
ONeal v. Stuart, 281 Fed. 715 (6th Cir. 1922).
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on the implied promise that the debtor will repay the amount paid
for his use.44 The surety is denied the right to treat himself as an

assignee of the instrument in the majority of jurisdictions. 45
In Perkins v. Hall46 the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia, speaking through Judge Fox regarding West Virginia
Code, chapter 45, article 1, section 4, relating to remedies of a
surety or guarantor who has made payment in behalf of the principal, said: "It is true that under our statute ... any person liable
as bail, surety, guarantor, indorser and other parties named may
obtain a judgment at law for said sum for their principal, or person
primarily liable but, as we view it, these statutes merely provide a
remedy in addition to that which might be invoked under the equitable powers of the court providing for contribution or subrogation,
and not based on the instrument evidencing the original obligation,
but arises from the implied obligation of the persons whose duty it
was to pay the same."
The West Virginia Code, chapter 46, article 8, section 1(d),
differs in language from the corresponding section 119 of the uniform act relating to discharge of a negotiable instrument. The West
Virginia Code specifies: "A negotiable instrument is discharged...
(d) When the person primarily liable becomes the holder of the
instrument at or after maturity in his own right." While the uniform act, section 119 (5) reads: "A negotiable instrument is discharged: . . . (5) When the principal debtor becomes the holder

of the instrument at or after maturity in his own right."
It is clear that one may be primarily liable on the instrument
having signed as maker, but still not be the principal debtor. Under
the language of the uniform act it is possible for the courts to
construe the language to permit an accommodation party who has
paid to be treated as a purchaser of the instrument. 47 In Fox v.
Kroeger4 l the Supreme Court of Texas, speaking through Judge
Critz, stated: "... [W]here the surety pays the debt of the prin-

cipal, he has his election to either pursue his legal remedies and
bring an action on an assumpsit, or the obligation implied by law in
his favor for reimbursement by the principal; or he can prosecute an
action on the very debt itself, and in either event he stands in the
44 Conrad v. Buck, 21 W. Va. 396 (1883).

Grizzle v. Fletcher, 127 Va. 663, 105 S.E. 457 (1920).
46 123 W. Va. 707, 17 S.E.2d 795 (1941).
47 Fox v. Kroeger, 119 Tex. 511, 35 S.W.2d 679 (1931).
48 Id. at 513, 35 S.W.2d 681.
45
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shoes of the original creditor as to any securities and rights of priority." The better view and the one supported by the weight of
authority is that payment by the accommodation maker, before
or at maturity of the note, bars any future action based solely on
the instrument
The measure of recovery by the surety against the principal
debtor is usually limited to the sum actually paid by the surety
including principal and interest,4 9 if the payment is not at once
made by the principal, the surety is entitled to receive interest from
the principal on the whole sum paid.50 If the surety extinguishes
the debt for a sum less than the face amount of the instrument the
surety is permitted to recover from the principal, in the absence of
an agreement otherwise, only the amount actually paid. He is not
entitled to recover for procuring a credit on the principal's debt.51
Whether the surety is entitled to recover costs and expenses incurred
in defending an action by the creditor against him is somewhat
52
uncertain.
ACCOmmODATION AND IBBEGULAR INDoRSEas

Prior to the adoption of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments
Act the liability of an accommodation indorser upon a negotiable
instrument lacked uniformity throughout the states.53 In many
states a party placing his name upon a negotiable instrument as
an accommodation indorser before delivery was treated as a joint
or joint and several maker with the one who signed on the face
of the instrument, so far as the necessity for demand and notice of
nonpayment were concerned. 54 The uniform act has wrought such
a change in the common law as to relieve the accommodation in4 If the surety pays the debt of his principal in depreciated currency, the
general rule is, that he can demand from his principal only the value of the
currency at the time of payment, and the criterion of that value is the market
value.5 Butler v. Butler's Adm'r, 8 W. Va. 674 (1873).
0Whether the surety, who has paid costs and expenses on account of
the debt of his principal, can recover the same from his principal depends
upon the circumstances of each case. Circumstances did not warrant recovery
of fees. Recovery limited to amount paid, principal and interest from date of
such 51payment. Cranmer v. MeSwords, 26 W. Va. 412 (1885).
Feamster v. Withrow, 12 W. Va. 611 (1878); Matthews v. Halls
Adm'r,
52 21 W. Va. 510 (1883).
Apgar's Adm'rs v. Hiler, 24 N.J.L. 811 (1854).
53
Westinghouse Electric, etc., Co. v. Hupp, 211 Mich. 698, 179 N.W.
286 (1920): Farmers' & Merchants Bank v. Kingwood National Bank, 85
W. Va. 371, 101 S.E. 734 (1920); Thompson v. Curry, 79 W. Va. 771, 91
S.E. 801 (1911).
54 Stuart v. Oliver, 110 Me. 208, 85 At. 747 (1913).
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dorser from liability in any capacity other than that of an endorsei.
The liability of an accommodation or irregular indorser under the
uniform act, sections 64 5 and 66,56 may be clearly seen to be identical with that of a general indorser 5 7 Section 64 defines an irregular indorser as follows: "Where a person not otherwise a party
to an instrument places thereon his signature in blank before delivery, he is liable as an indorser in accordance with the following
rules: (1)If the instrument is payable to the order of a third
person, he is liable to the payee and to all subsequent parties."
Section 66 prescribes the conditional liability of those indorsing
other than qualifiedly. This section in no way reduces or diminishes
the liability of the irregular indorser. 58
In Ingalls v. Marston5 9 the court stated:

...
[W] hether one
be an irregular indorser under section 64 or a regular indorser under
section 66, he is entitled to have due demand made upon the maker
and due notice of dishonor given himself. The irregular indorser
is no longer a joint maker or an original promisor, as he was prior
to the passage of the uniform act, but an indorser with all that the
term implies." 60

As was true in the cases involving an accommodation maker,6 '

no consideration moves to the accommodation indorser for his
indorsement from the creditor. The value received by the maker
or drawer supports the obligation of one who indorses for his accommodation.6 2 If the accommodation indorsement be placed upon
the instrument subsequent to the delivery thereof, new consideration must be shown to so support the contractual obligation
of the indorser.63 However, if the instrument be further negotiated
for value,6 4 or where there has been a prior agreement for the
indorsement and the indorser was aware of the agreement, no new
55 W. Vs.. CODE ch. 46, art. 5,
56 Id. ch. 46, art. 5, § 7.

§ 5 (Michie 1955).

57
Whittemann v. Sands, 238 N.Y. 434, 114 N.E. 671 (1924); Case v.
McKinnis,
107 Ore. 223, 213 Pac. 422 (1923).
58
Home Insurance Co. v. Bishop, 140 Me. 72, 34 A.2d 22 (1943).
590 121 Me. 182, 116 At]. 216 (1922).
6 Rockefield v. First Nat. Bank, 77 Ohio St. 311, 83 N.E. 392, 14 L.R.A.
(N.s.) 842 (1907).
81 First National Bank v. Freeman, 83 W. Va. 477, 98 S.E. 558 (1919).
62
Falkier v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 228 Ala. 57, 152 So. 34 (1934);
Naef v. Potter, 127 IMI.App. 106, aff'd, 226 111.
628, 80 N.E. 1084, 11 L.R.A.

(N.s.)6 3 1034 (1907).

Bank of Skidmore v. Ripley, 84 S.W.2d 185 (Mo. App. 1935). Merchants' State Bank v. Roline, 200 Iowa 1059, 205 N.W. 863 (1925).
64 Francis v. Federal Reserve Bank, 69 S.W.2d 441 (Tex.Civ. App. 1934).
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consideration need change hands at the time the indorsement is
65
added.
The West Virginia Code chapter 46, article 5, section 9 designates the order of liability of indorsers in slightly different language
than that of the corresponding section of the uniform act.66 This
section provides that the accommodation or irregular indorsers, who
indorse for the same party, are prima facie equally liable; but in
any case evidence is admissible to show that as between or among
themselves they have agreed otherwise.67 Prior to the amendment
of this section of the West Virginia Code the court in settling conflicts between the indorsers had been driven to the necessity of
fixing the liability of coindorsers as being equal even though no
agreement for such actually existed between the parties. Under
the statute the coindorsers, as distinguished from successive indorsers, are equally bound in the absence of an agreement to the
contrary. 68 The code also makes their liability joint and several to
the holder of the instrument.
In the absence of a statute 69 or an agreement70 to the contrary
the joint indorsers have as between themselves equal as distinguished from successive liability. They have the right to seek
contribution from those with whom they are equally liable. 7 ' An
agreement between those jointly liable to be other than equally
liable may be proven by parol testimony.7 2
Parol evidence is not admissible to show that the indorsers
intended to contract for liability on the instrument other than that
expressed by the statute for such indorsers, 7' but it is admissible
65

Bedrosian v. Der Manouelian, 48 RI. 40, 134 AUt. 851 (1926); Devitt
v. Foster,
159 Miss. 687, 132 So. 182 (1931).
66
"As respects one another, indorsers are liable prima facie in order in
which they indorsed; but evidence is admissible to show that as between themselves, successive accommodation parties are liable in order in which their
names appear, even though later signers knew that prior parties signed for
accommodation."
UNwoma NEGoTmLE INsThumaE
AcT § 68.
6T
68 Davis v. Solomon, 101 Conn. 465, 126 AUt. 724 (1924).
McKown v. Silver, 99 W. Va. 78, 128 S.E. 134 (1925); Elkins v.
Tompkins, 94 W. Va. 136, 117 S.E. 914 (1928); Mann v. Bradshaw's Adm'r,
136 Va.
351, 118 S.E. 326 (1928).
6
9 Blair v. Wells, 156 Ark. 470, 246 S.W. 498 (1928).
T
OBringardner v. Rollins, 102 W. Va. 584, 185 S.E. 665 (1926); Holston
v. Haley, 125 Me. 485, 135 At. 98 (1926); Tait v. Downey, 267 Mass. 422,
166 N.E. 857 (1929).
71 Holton v. Rose, 270 Mass. 267, 169 N.E. 923 (1930).
72 Holston v. Haley, 125 Me. 485, 135 At. 98 (1926).
7a Thompson v. Curry, 79 W. Va. 771, 91 S.E. 801 (1917); Missouri
State Life Ins. Co. v. Kohl, 265 IM. App. 428 (1933); Matawan Tile Co. v.
Golden, 53 Pa. Super. 430 (1913).
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to show the order of their liability and how they agreed to share
the loss as between themselves. The accommodation indorser may
74
by parol testimony establish who is the accommodated party,
or that another indorser is equally liable with him. 7 5 When two
or more parties have become equal accommodation indorsers, they
are as between themselves cosureties so far as their rights between
themselves are concerned. 76 If the courts were to deny the admission of parol evidence to show joint accommodation indorsers, it
would be impossible for the indorser who had been called upon to
make payment to establish his right to contribution from one who
77
had agreed to be equally liable for payment.
Likewise, if the admission of parol evidence to show the true
relation of the parties were denied, the accommodation indorser
would be unable to defend against the accommodated party. One
might also consider the situation where A and B indorsed X's note
for the accommodation of X, and H is now the holder of the instrument. Due presentment, dishonor, and notice of dishonor having
been given, H has the right to proceed to collect the amount of the
note from A, B or X. If A makes payment to H, A may by the
use of parol testimony show that he and B, whose indorsement followed that of A, were in fact equally liable and be entitled to seek
contributions from B for the sum paid. If B had paid H, instead of A, and should then seek to proceed against A, as a
prior indorser, for the full amount of the instrument, clearly A
should be permitted to introduce parol evidence to show that he
was a coindorser with B and should only be liable to contribute to
the sum paid by B. The party alleging the coindorser relationship
78
has the burden of so proving.
A holder paying the full value for the instrument is entitled
to recover from the accommodation indorser the face amount of
the instrument irrespective of whether the purchaser did or did not
know of the accommodation nature of the indorsement. 79 If the
74

(1924).
75

Wittemann v. Sands, 238 N.Y. 434, 144 N.E. 671, 87 A.L.R. 1216

Brain v. Hill, 61 Ga. App. 756, 7 S.E.2d 407 (1940).
76 Bennet v. Kistler, 163 N.Y. Supp. 555 (App. Div. 1917).
77 Bringardner v. Rollins, 102 W. Va. 584, 135 S.E. 665 (1926); Gafford
v. Tittle, 224 Ala. 605, 141 So. 653 (1932); In re Wingert, 89 F. 2d 805

(4th Cir. 1937).
78 UmNrom NEGOTIABLE INsmrusmNTs AcT § 68; W. VA. CODE ch. 46,
art 5, § 9; McKown v. Silver, 99 W. Va. 78, 128 S.E. 134 (1925); Moriarty v.
King, 817 Mass. 210, 57 N.E.2d 633 (1954).
i9 Spring v. Major, 127 Okla. 279, 260 Pac. 763 (1927).
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holder has acquired the instrument for a sum less than the face
amount of the instrument, there is some uncertainty and conflict in
authorities as to the amount which the holder may be entitled to
recover from the accommodation indorser. In the old cases in some
jurisdictions the holder was only permitted to recover the sum paid
for the instrument, 80 while in others he was entitled to recover
the face of the obligation. 8 ' There seems to be no sound reason
under the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act why the purchaser
of a negotiable instrument for less than its face value should not
be permitted to recover from the accommodation indorser the face
amount of the instrument as he certainly would be permitted to do
from one indorsing other than by the way of accommodationL

INDoasR's

RIGHTs UPON PAYMENT

"WVhere the instrument is paid by the party secondarily liable

thereon, it is not discharged, but the party paying it is remitted
to his former rights regarding all prior parties. . .. 82
Under this section of the uniform act payment by one secondarily liable does not have the effect of discharging the instrument.
The accommodation indorser, unlike the accommodation maker, is
entitled to pursue his remedy against prior parties in an action
based solely upon the instrument.88 Where one has indorsed for
the accommodation of another it is obvious that he was never the
owner of the instrument or enjoyed any rights thereon. If section

121 of the uniform act were taken literally, the accommodation party
might well be considered to be restored to a nonexisting right. The
words "remitted to his former rights" are restricted in their application to a party secondarily liable and do not apply to one who
is secondarily liable by the way of an accommodation indorser.8 4
This section refers to indorsers for value and not to accommodation
indorsers. 85 It was not the intent of this section to deny an accommodation indorser, who has paid, the right to bring an action on
the instrument.
80

Holeman v. Hobson 27 Tenn. 127 (1847); Kleim v. Penn T. Bank,

1 Pa. 86 (1845).

81Rule v. Williams, 8 Ky. L.R. 152 (1886).
82W. VA. CODE, ch. 46, art. 8, § 3 (Michie 1955); UNxwosm NEGOTIABLE
I~s'Tuurrs
AcT § 121.
88
Assets Realization Co. v. Mercantile Nat Bank, 153 N.Y. Supp. 156
(App. Div. 1915); Josephsohn v. Gens, 85 Misc. 372, 147 N.Y. Supp. 451 (Sup.
Ct. 1914).
84 Lill'v. Gleason, 92 Kan. 754, 142 Pac. 287 (1914).
85 Noble v. Beeman-Spaulding-Woodward Co., 65 Ore. 93, 131 Pac. 1006
(1913).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1959

13

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 2 [1959], Art. 2

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
The accommodation indorser upon paying the sum of the
instrument is certainly entitled to institute an action based on the
instrument against any prior party thereto. When the accommodation indorser has obtained the instrument at a discount, the
measure of his recovery becomes important. Some courts treat the
accommodation party on the same basis as a surety seeking reimbursement and limit recovery to the sum actually paid for the instrument, 86 while the better reasoned cases will permit full recovery
87
by the accommodation party of the amount of the instrument.
CONTRIBUTION BETWEEN AccOMMODAOION PARTES

When two or more persons become joint accommodation parties
to the obligation of another, they occupy the position of cosureties
as to each other. As to the principal obligor, they have the right
of reimbursement; as between themselves they have the right of
contribution.
As with the right to seek reimbursement, the equity courts
were the first to recognize the right of contribution based upon an
implied understanding between the cosureties. 88 Originally the
courts of law would not entertain an action for contribution in the
absence of an express agreement therefor. However, by the eighteenth century the law courts likewise began to permit recovery based
89
on the contract implied in fact.

One cosurety is not entitled to contribution from his cosurety
until he has paid more than his share of the principars debt. If the
surety is able to negotiate a settlement of the debt for a sum less
than his proportionate share of the debt, the surety paying is permitted to seek contribution from his cosureties upon the amount
actually paid to obtain the discharge of the debt,90 and not the
amount of the discharged debt.
If the cosureties of the paying surety have consented to his
becoming bound, their implied promise to contribute in the event
of nonpayment by the principal includes the sum of attorney fees,
86 Pace v. Robertson, 65 N.C. 550 (1871); Burton v. Slaughter, 26 Gratt.
914, 867T Va. 298 (1875).
Fowler v. Strickland, 107 Mass. 552 (1871).
88
Fleetwood v. Charnock, Nel. 10, 21 Eng. Rep. 776 (1629); Peter v.
Rich,891 Ch. 34, 21 Eng. Rep. 499 (1629).
Merchants Discount Corp. v. Federal Street Corp., 300 Mass. 167,
14 N.E.2d 155 (1938); Leigh v. Wright, 183 La. 765, 164 So. 795 (1935);
Szctrrr § 150.
Rmr AmarnT,
9
0 Sloo v. Pool, 15 M1.47 (1853).
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costs and sum paid. 91 It was held, in United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. v. Naylor,92 that if a surety in defending in good faith
but unsuccessfully against the creditor incurs attorney fees and costs
this sum is to be added to the sum paid for determining the basis
for contribution. 93 When the parties have not agreed to the cosurety arrangement, such attorney fees and court costs are not
94
included for determining the amount of contribution.
When the surety has paid more than his share of the joint
debt, his cosurety owes him the duty to immediately contribute to
the sum paid. The paying surety has the legal right to receive
interest at the legal rate from his cosurety on that portion over and
above his proportionate share of the debt. The right to recover
interest at the legal rate is permitted, even though the original obligation provided for a different rate of interest. 95
If all cosureties are solvent and amenable to process, it is relatively unimportant whether the proceedings for contribution be in
law or equity. When, however, one or more of the cosureties is
insolvent or absent from the state, the forum in which the proceedings is brought is most important.
If the action be brought at law, contribution is enforced only
for the aliquot share-of each cosurety. Insolvency or nonresidence
of a cosurety does not exclude him from consideration in determining the amount of recovery by the paying surety. The paying
surety is not permitted to collect more than his proportionate share
from any one of the cosureties. If there are three cosureties, each
will be liable to contribute one-third of the sum paid.96
If the surety pays more than his proportionate share of the
entire debt, but less than the full amount of the debt, and does not
obtain a full discharge of the obligation, the determination of the
amount of permitted recovery becomes more complicated. The paying surety has the right to seek from any cosurety a sum not exceed91

rnsme 242, 248 (1950).
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Naylor, 237 Fed. 814 (8th
Cir. 1916).
93
SImSON, Sn

92

94

EsTATEmENT, SEcmrmrY § 154 (1941).
Appleford v. Snake River Mining, Milling & Smelting Co., 122 Wash.

11, 210
Pac. 26 (1922).
95
Weimer, Wright & Watldns v. Talbot, 56 W. Va. 257, 49 S.E. 372
(1904).
98
" RATmvMnT,
EsrrESttON § 85, pp. 384, 385 (1937); 4 Poammoy,
EQUMTY JURISDIcrToN 6 §§ 14. 18 (5th ed. 1941); Cooper v. Greenberg, 191

Va. 495,61 S.E.2d 875 (1950).
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ing the cosurety's proportionate share of the entire obligation, 97

which amount may not reduce the plaintiff's payment to a sum less
than his proportionate share of the entire debt. He may not collect
more than a proportionate share from any cosurety. 98 For example,
the principal debt is $900. A, B, and C are cosureties on the obligation of X. A pays $600 on the debt of X. As between the sureties,
A's share of the total debt is $300. A may recover $300 from B or
C, or $150 from each. A is not entitled to recover $200 from C as
this would reduce A's payment to a sum less than his $300 share
of the total debt. Until the debt is discharged the paying surety
may not simply divide the amount he has paid by the number of cosureties to determine the amount of his recovery from his cosureties.
If the surety has paid a sum less than his proportionate share
of the total debt, and the balance remains unpaid, the surety has
no right to seek contribution from any of the cosureties. 99
At law in the absence of statute, the parties from whom contribution is sought must be sued severally and cannot be joined as
defendants in the same action. 100 Many states by statute now permit
a joinder of cosureties in an action for contribution. A surety is free
to seek contribution from his cosureties in a law action without first
proceeding against the principal obligor or showing his insolvency.
Nor is it necessary for him to allege or prove the insolvency of any
of the other cosureties. It might be observed that it is improper to
join the principal obligor in an action against a cosurety when seeking contributions.
When, however, the action for contribution is in equity, the
principal obligor and all cosureties must be joined as parties defendant. 10 1 This requirement is only dispensed with upon allegation
and proof of insolvency of nonjoined party, 10 2 or upon showing his
absence from the jurisdiction of the court. 10 3 The courts of equity,
unlike the courts of law, have the right to enter a conditional decree.
The equity court may condition the decree against the surety upon
the failure of the petitioner to gain satisfaction from the principal
obligor.
9
7Phelps v. Scott, 325 Mo. 711, 30 S.W.2d 71, 68 A.L.R. 214
RE TTFATmrNT,
REsTiON § 85 (1937).
98
Lorimer v. Julius Knoch Coal Co., 246 Mich. 214, 224 N.W. 362
9

(1930);

(1929).
9 Labbe v. Bernard, 196 Mass. 551, 82 N.E. 688, 14 L.R.A. (x.s.) 457
(1907);0 Gross v. Davis, 87 Tenn. 226,1 11 S.W. 92 (1889).
' ;Cornstock v. Potter, 191 Mich. 629, 158 N.W. 102 (1916).
1o Craythorne v. Swinburne, 14 Ves. Jr. 160, 83 Eng. Rep. 482 (1807).

102Phelps v. Scott, 325 Mo. 711, 30 S.W.2d 71 (1930).
103 Jones v. Blanton, 41 N.C. 115, 51 Am. Dec. 415 (1848).
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In the court of equity those shown to be insolvent or out of the
jurisdiction are subtracted from the total number of sureties before
determining the proportionate share of the solvent sureties. 0 4 Suppose we have five sureties on Y's obligation in the sum of $10,000.
Surety one pays Y's obligation without any discount being given.
If surety one can show that surety two is insolvent, or out of the
jurisdiction, he would be entitled to recover $2,500 from each surety
three, four and five. That is, in equity we divide the number of
solvent sureties within the jurisdiction into the sum paid to determine the amount due from each of the sureties by.the way of contribution. If the action had been at law the recovery from each
would have been limited to not more than $2,000 for the law court
takes no cognizance of the inability of one cosurety to contribute
his share of the sum paid. Many states now apply the equitable
rule for determining the sum of recovery whether the proceedings
be in law or in equity. In West Virginia it appears important, in
determining the amount of recovery by way of contribution, whether
the action be in equity or law.105 It is submitted that the equitable
rule is more just and more likely to meet the ends of justice than
the rule of the law courts.
SUMMARY

The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act was adopted with
the thought that most problems connected with negotiable instruments would be simplified and the answers more certain. It may
be seen that the creditors who insist upon an accommodation maker
or accommodation indorser as a device to diminish the financial risk
have only accomplished this result in part.
It seems that the laws of suretyship are as important today to
negotiable instruments as they were before the adoption of the
uniform act. It is suggested that at some future date the legislatures
should consider enactment of uniform rules of suretyship to bring
even a greater degree of uniformity to the laws relating to negotiable instruments. The uniform act has accomplished must, but
much still remains to be codified.
Particular attention should be given to the capacity in which
one has placed his name upon the instrument, the theory under
104 Tucker v. Nicholson, 12 Cal. 2d 427, 84 P.2d 1045; Cooper v. Greenberg, 191 Va. 495, 61 S.E.2d 875 (1950)
105 Weimer, Wright, Watkins v. Tat
56 W. Va. 257, 49 S.E. 872 (1904).
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which recovery is sought, the various statutes of limitation, the
rights of reimbursement and of contribution, and whether the
proceedings might better be in equity than in law. As our commercial transactions increase, so will the legal problqms relating to
this subject increase and become more complex.
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